A dual early warning model of bank distress by Papanikolaou, N.I.
BAFES –
Bournemouth Accounting, Finance & 
Economic Series
NO 11 / 2017
A dual Early Warning Model of 
Bank Distress
Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou
     1 
  
 
A Dual Early Warning Model of Bank Distress 
 
Nikolaos I. Papanikolaouh 
Bournemouth University, Department of Accounting, Finance & Economics, United Kingdom 
 
 
Abstract 
We contribute to the better understanding of the key factors related to the operation 
of the banking system that led to the global financial crisis through the development 
of a dual earning warning model that explores the joint determination of the 
probability of a distressed bank to face a licence withdrawal or to be bailed out. The 
underlying patterns of distress are analysed based upon a wide spectrum of bank-
specific and environmental factors. We obtain precise parameter estimates and 
superior in- and out-of-sample forecasts. Our results show that the determinants of 
failures and those of bailouts differ to a considerable extent, revealing that authorities 
treat a distressed bank differently in their decision to let it fail or to bail it out. 
Overall, we provide a reliable mechanism for preventing welfare losses due to bank 
distress. 
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1. Introduction       
During the global financial crisis, a large number of banks worldwide either failed or were bailed 
out thus inflicting substantial losses on the system. From an economic viewpoint, the 
recapitalisation of banks doubled with the cost of failures and that of the large stimulus 
programmes which governments launched to revive demand led to the explosion of public debt 
in many advanced economies. Laeven and Valencia (2012) highlight that episodes of banking 
crises result in a 23% cumulative output loss as well as substantial increases in fiscal debt. 
Therefore, the need for the development of an early warning system capable to predict bank 
distress has recently come to the forefront in the relevant literature which dates back to Meyer 
and Pifer (1970), Sinkey (1975), Martin (1977), and Pettway and Sinkey (1980). 
     In this short paper, we design a system that detects the early bankruptcy signals as well as the 
early warnings for distressed banks, which are likely to need support in case of a financial 
debacle. The distress events are treated as competing hazards in our analysis. This is the first 
time that such a dual system of distress is developed. An additional innovative feature of our 
study is that the analysis is conducted within the dynamic framework proposed by Shumway 
(2001), which allows the distress probability assigned to each bank to vary with time. 
Notwithstanding its attracting features, the Shumway approach has been only marginally applied 
in the banking literature. 
     The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the sample banks and the data. The 
model is developed in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discusses the in- and the out-of-sample 
estimation results, and Section 5 concludes. 
  
2. Sample banks and data 
We focus on U.S. commercial and savings banks that file a Report on Condition and Income 
(Call Report). Distressed banks either filed for bankruptcy or were bailed out during the crisis. 
Acquired banks as well as those which were merged with some other institution not at the 
initiative of the Federal regulatory agencies are considered to be a third group of distressed 
banks. As such, and in order to avoid any spurious effects on the probabilities of failure and 
bailout, the latter banks are excluded from our sample. Banks that do not fall in any of the 
aforementioned categories are labelled ‘non-distressed’. 
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     Failed banks are the insured banks that were closed requiring disbursements by the 
authorities. In the event of failure, the institution’s charter is terminated and assets and liabilities 
are transferred to a successor charter. In total, 167 bankruptcies were recorded during the 
examined period. 
     Bailed out banks are those that received capital injections under the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP) of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). We obtain the complete list of TARP/CPP 
recipients from the U.S. Treasury and trace all banks which participated in the programme either 
directly, or through their parent holding companies. In total, we identify 824 assisted institutions. 
     Our data are of quarterly frequency and extend from the beginning of 2003 (2003q1) to the 
end of 2009 (2009q4), because the final TARP/CPP investment was made on December 30, 
2009. We begin with 8,722 banks that filed a Call Report in 2003q1. By checking the data for 
reporting errors and other inconsistencies, we end up with a set of 7,602 banks of which 167 are 
failed, 824 are bailed out, and 6,611 are non-distressed. 
 
3. The model 
Failed and bailed out banks exit from our sample the quarter they went bankrupt or received 
TARP/CPP assistance, respectively. We define the event-specific hazard function of survival 
time T:  
 
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥) = lim
𝛥𝑡→0
𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡, 𝐽 = 𝑗│𝑇 ≥ 𝑡, 𝑥)
𝛥𝑡
,                                        (1) 
 
where ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥)is the instantaneous rate of exit due to distress event J at t given x; j=1, 2, where 1 
stands for failure and 2 for bailout; x is the vector of covariates; and, t represents quarters, where 
t=1 corresponds to 2003q1, and t=28 reflects 2009q4. 
     The bailout of a bank precludes its failure and vice versa. Hence, the overall hazard is the sum 
of the two individual hazards: 
ℎ(𝑡; 𝑥) = ∑ ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥)
2
𝑗=1
.                                                                (2) 
 
A bank’s probability to survive longer than t is:  
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𝑆𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥) = 𝑃[𝑇 > 𝑡; 𝑥] =  exp [− ∫ ℎ𝑗(𝑢; 𝑥)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
].                                         (3) 
 
The probability density function is: 
 
𝑓𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥) = lim
𝛥𝑡→0
𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡, 𝐽 = 𝑗│𝑇 ≥ 𝑡, 𝑥)
𝛥𝑡
=  ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥)𝑆𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥).                         (4) 
 
Failures and bailouts occur at ijt , where i=1, 2,…, n (n=7,602) indexes the sample banks. A 
censoring term 𝑑𝑖𝑗 equals to unity if bank i exits the sample at ijt due to any of the distress events 
and zero if otherwise.  
     The partial likelihood function is: 
 
𝐿 = ∏ ∏((ℎ𝑗𝑖(𝑡𝑖𝑗; 𝑥𝑖𝑗))
𝑑𝑖𝑗 
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑆(𝑡𝑖𝑗; 𝑥𝑖𝑗)),
2
𝑗=1
                                                    (5) 
 
where 𝑗𝑖 stands for the type of distress of bank i, which does not enter into Equation (5) if 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 equals to 0, implying that a censored observation is assumed for each competing distress 
event.  
     Recall that we made no functional assumptions to obtain Equation (1). Since time is 
continuous and both failure and bailout hazards remain constant over discrete time intervals, the 
piecewise exponential approach is preferable: 
 
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥) = ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) exp(𝛽𝑗
′𝑥),                                                         (6) 
 
where ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) reflects the baseline hazard function, which is allowed to differ between the two 
types of distress; 𝛽𝑗′is the coefficient vector that indicates the effects of covariates for the event 
type j, showing that different sets of coefficients are jointly estimated for each j. 
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     Following Shumway (2001), we generalise Equation (6) to incorporate time-varying 
covariates: 
 
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥(𝑡)) = ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) exp[𝛽𝑗
′𝑥(𝑡)].                                                    (7) 
 
     In Equation (7), both failure and bailout hazards are independent from each other. In reality, 
however, the two hazards are directly associated to the decisions of authorities and, hence, to one 
another: a distressed bank either receives TARP/CPP money, or it is left to go bankrupt. Not 
only may a bank be more likely to be bailed out if it is in distress, but regulators’ decision to 
approve or reject a TARP/CPP application is also linked to the health of the applicant institution. 
We, therefore, introduce a heterogeneity term 𝑣𝑗: 
  
ℎ𝑗(𝑡; 𝑥(𝑡)) = ℎ0𝑗(𝑡) exp[𝛽𝑗
′𝑥(𝑡) + 𝑣𝑗].                                             (8) 
 
     Equation (8) allows dependence between the two distress events, as it does not require 𝑣𝑗  and 
𝑣𝑙 to be independent for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑙, where l = 1, 2. Hence, we allow banks which are more likely to 
receive assistance for reasons not captured by our model specification to be more/less likely to 
be closed by regulators. 
     The patterns of distress are analysed based upon the following set of covariates x. We proxy 
the components of CAMELS system, which is utilised by U.S. authorities to monitor bank 
soundness. Equity-to-assets ratio measures capital strength (CAP); asset quality is reflected in the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (ASSETQLT); management expertise is proxied by 
total operating income divided by earning assets (MNGEXP); returns on assets measure earnings 
strength (EARN); the ratio of cash and balances to total deposits captures liquidity (LQDT); and, 
sensitivity to market risk (SENSRISK) is given by the change between the 10-year and 3-month 
T-bill rates divided by earning assets. 
     We account for three indicators of systemic importance: first, bank size (SIZE), which is 
measured by the logarithm of total assets; second, organisational complexity (ORGCOMPL), 
proxied by the logarithm of the product of the number of branches of each bank and the number 
of U.S. States in which the bank has branches; and, third, business complexity, captured by the 
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amount of outstanding balance of securitised assets divided by total assets (SECASSET), as well 
as the ratio of the amount of outstanding derivative contracts to equity capital (DERIV). 1  
     We construct two dummy variables: POLCON that accounts for bank connections with 
policy-makers, and FEDCON that indicates if an executive at a bank has been on the board of 
directors of one of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks. We resort to the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP)’s Revolving Door database to construct POLCON. For the construction of FEDCON, we 
first obtain data on the top executives of our sample banks from BoardEx and then match them to 
the list of directors found in the Fed’s website. In addition, we capture whether a bank is 
involved in a M&A transaction as acquirer (MA), and whether it is located in a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA). MA relies on data from the relevant files of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago. To construct MSA, we identify the geographical location of each sample bank through 
Call Reports; detailed data for Metropolitan Statistical Areas are taken from the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget. We also account for banks less than five years old (DENOVO) and for 
listed banks (PUBLIC); the relevant data are collected from Call Reports. The quarterly change 
in the U.S. Consumer Price Index (INF), and the GDP output gap (GDP) are employed in our 
model to control for macroeconomic conditions. Data for GDP are obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce; INF is taken from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. In-sample estimation 
We estimate Equation (8) using non-distressed banks as the holdout group. The coefficients for 
failure and bailout hazards are jointly estimated. 
     As shown in Table 1, capital (CAP) is beneficial for banks’ health, as it reduces both hazards 
under examination. When credit quality (ASSETQLT) worsens, the failure hazard becomes 
higher, while that of bailout is not significantly affected. Efficient management (MNGEXP) 
exerts a decreasing impact on the likelihood of failure, but has no significant effect on that of 
bailout. Profitability (EARN) and liquidity (LQDT) lower both failure and bailout probabilities. 
By contrast, market risk sensitivity (SENSRISK) increases both probabilities. 
                                                 
1 All accounting variables are collected from Call Reports. Interest rates are obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Board and the U.S. Department of Treasury. 
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Table 1. In-sample estimation 
           Failure   Bailout 
CAP  -1.59***       (-3.94) 
        -1.42*** 
       (-4.33) 
ASSETQLT   1.32***        (3.20) 
          0.80 
         (1.48) 
MNGEXP        -2.02***       (-2.69) 
          1.12 
         (1.42) 
EARN        -1.19***       (-3.95) 
         -1.48** 
        (-2.19) 
LQDT        -1.48***       (-2.80) 
         -1.23** 
        (-2.36) 
SENSRISK 0.78**        (2.31) 
          0.97** 
         (2.44) 
SIZE        -1.43***       (-5.02) 
          1.62*** 
         (4.49) 
ORGCOMPL        -0.58**       (-1.96) 
          1.00** 
         (2.28) 
SECASSET        -2.03***       (-3.91) 
          5.95*** 
         (3.31) 
DERIV        -2.85***       (-2.68) 
          5.46*** 
         (3.70) 
POLCON   -1.95***       (-5.03) 
          2.50*** 
         (3.21) 
FEDCON         -1.04**        (-2.08) 
          1.04** 
         (2.10) 
MA  -0.35***       (-3.40) 
         -0.21 
        (-1.38) 
MSA        -0.06**       (-2.32) 
          0.11*** 
         (3.87) 
DENOVO        0.19**       (2.41) 
          0.40 
         (1.44) 
PUBLIC       -0.11**      (-2.57) 
         0.10** 
        (2.29) 
INF        0.14**       (1.97) 
         -0.18 
       (-1.14) 
GDP       -0.21**      (-2.42) 
        -0.09 
       (-1.18) 
Pseudo 𝑅2 (%) 41.15 
Heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-White t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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     Further, large (SIZE) and complex (ORGCOMPL, SECASSET, DERIV) banks are less likely 
to face a licence withdrawal and more likely to be bailed out. These evidences provide strong 
support to the Too-Big-To-Fail and the Too-Complex-To-Fail phenomena in banking. Moreover, 
authorities are more prone to bail out a distressed bank, which is well-connected with politicians 
and regulators (POLCON, FEDCON) and less prone to let it fail. Crucially, the effects of the 
additional bank-specific variables (MA, MSA, DENOVO, PUBLIC) and the environmental 
variables (INF, GDP) confirm that, on the whole, the determinants of failures and those of 
bailouts differ from each other to a considerable degree. This implies that authorities treat a bank 
differently in their decision to let it fail or to bail it out. 
 
4.2. Out-of-sample estimation 
We resort to the decile forecasting accuracy test that captures the model’s ability to predict an 
event from which actual probabilities of that event can be inferred once the coefficients of the 
examined model are estimated. Sample banks are sorted into deciles in each quarter from 2009q2 
to 2009q4 based on the fitted probability values of the model covariates. Fitted probabilities are 
then created by combining the coefficients estimated using 2003q1-2009q1 data with data for 
each subsequent quarter, i.e., 2009q2 to 2009q4. 
 
   Table 2. Out-of-sample estimation  
Decile Prob. (%) Cum Prob. 
(%) 
Failures Prob. (%) Cum Prob. 
(%) 
Bailouts 
1 62.30 62.30 104 60.80 60.80 501 
2 19.70 82.00 33 18.80 79.60 155 
3 4.30 86.30 7 5.20 84.80 43 
4 3.00 89.30 5 4.70 89.50 39 
5 4.20 93.50 7 1.70 91.20 14 
6-10 6.50 100.00 11 8.80 100.00 72 
   167   824 
 
    Table 2 shows that our model classifies 62.30% of failures (104 banks) in the highest 
probability decile at the quarter in which they declare bankruptcy. Moreover, it predicts 19.70% 
of failures (33 banks) in the second top decile. Overall, it predicts 82.00% of failures (137 banks) 
in the top two deciles. Similarly, the model classifies 79.60% of bailouts (656 banks) in the 
highest two deciles. In sum, the out-of-sample ability of our model to predict distress is very 
strong.  
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     The dynamic nature of our model provides us with the advantage of examining how distress 
probability varies over time. This cannot be achieved if discrete choice models like discriminant 
analysis, probit, or logit models are utilised instead. Moreover, banks’ health is measured as a 
function of a broad set of variables. Overall, we obtain precise parameter estimates and superior 
out-of-sample forecasts.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Numerous banking institutions around the globe faced severe liquidity problems and capital 
shortages after the eruption of the global financial crisis in mid-to-late 2007. National 
governments in close cooperation with regulatory authorities spent a vast amount of money to 
keep many of these institutions afloat with the utmost purpose to protect the financial system 
from a sort of chain domino defaults and to restore the confidence in it. On the other hand, 
several distressed banks went bankrupt, incurring a large cost to governments, bank customers, 
bond holders, market participants, and tax payers. 
     We develop a dual early warning system of distress that offers valuable insights to policy 
makers on how to better structure the components of the banking industry with the purpose to 
reduce actions that exert a negative impact on bank soundness and harm the stability of the 
system. We provide strong evidence that banking organisations with inadequate capital, illiquid 
and risky assets, poor management, low levels of earnings and high sensitivity to market 
conditions have a higher bankruptcy probability. However, not all the aforementioned factors 
play an important role in the probability of a bank to receive assistance in the case of financial 
debacle. In specific, management quality, as reflected in the ability of managers to create profits 
for their banks, does not significantly affect the likelihood of a bank to receive financial aid. 
Further, the quality of bank assets is found not to be relevant to the bailout likelihood.  
     Our findings also reveal that large and complex financial institutions are less likely to face a 
licence withdrawal and more likely to be bailed out. Moreover, authorities are found to be more 
prone to provide support to a distressed institution which is well-connected with politicians and 
political parties and less prone to let it go bankrupt. Crucially, the effects of an additional set of 
key bank-specific variables together with a set of environmental variables that we employ in our 
analysis confirm that, on the whole, the determinants of bank failures and those of bailouts differ 
from each other to a considerable degree.  
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     Overall, our model is capable of providing the necessary signals to distinguish healthy from 
distressed institutions and, hence, to work as an effective mechanism for preventing future 
welfare losses due to failures and bailouts in case of a financial breakdown. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  11 
References  
Laeven, L., Valencia, F., 2012. Systemic banking brises database: an update. International 
Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/12/163. 
Martin, D., 1977. Early warning model of bank failure: a logit regression approach. Journal of 
Banking and Finance 1, 249-276. 
Meyer, P.A., Pifer, H.W., 1970. Prediction of bank failures. Journal of Finance 25, 853-868. 
Pettway, R.H., Sinkey, J.F.Jr., 1980. Establishing on-site bank examination priorities: an early-
warning system using accounting and market information. The Journal of Finance 35, 137-
150. 
Shumway T., 2001. Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: a simple hazard model. Journal of 
Business 74, 101-124. 
Sinkey, J.F., 1975. A multivariate statistical analysis of the characteristics of problem banks. 
Journal of Finance 30, 21-35. 
 
 
 
